Belief Free Incomplete Information Games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Belief Free Incomplete Information Games

Published:2007 Issue: Volume: Page:
ISSN:1556-5068
Container-title:SSRN Electronic Journal
language:en
Short-container-title:SSRN Journal

Author:

Bergemann Dirk,Morris Stephen Edward

Publisher

Elsevier BV

Reference23 articles.

1. \Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality;R Aumann;Econometrica,1987

2. Discussion Paper ECO 99/17;P Battigalli;\Rationalizability in Incomplete Information Games,1999

3. \Rationalization and Incomplete Information;P Battigalli;Advances in Theoretical Economics,2003

4. \Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms;D Bergemann;\Strategic Distinguishability with an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation,2001

5. Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design

Cited by 11 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. A Theory of Stability in Matching with Incomplete Information;American Economic Journal: Microeconomics;2023-02-01

2. Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex-Post Equilibria with Private Values;The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics;2022-09-14

3. Double Implementation in Dominant Strategy Equilibria and Ex Post Equilibria with Private Values;SSRN Electronic Journal;2019

4. Subsidizing research programs with “if” and “when” uncertainty in the face of severe informational constraints;The RAND Journal of Economics;2018-05-02

5. Implementability of correlated and communication equilibrium outcomes in incomplete information games;International Journal of Game Theory;2013-06-15