Social Judgments of Digitally Manipulated Stuttered Speech: Cognitive Heuristics Drive Implicit and Explicit Bias

Abstract

Purpose People who stutter are susceptible to discrimination, stemming from negative stereotypes and social misattributions. There has been a recent push to evaluate the underlying explicit and implicit cognitive mechanisms associated with social judgments, moving away from only evaluating explicit social bias about people who stutter. The purpose of the current study was to evaluate how listeners change their implicit and explicit social (mis)attributions after hearing a people who stutter produce disfluent speech. Method The current project was an adaptation of the Byrd et al. (2017) study to evaluate listener implicit/explicit social judgments of stuttered speech across five categories (i.e., confidence, friendliness, intelligence, distractibility, and extroversion) before and after a stuttering self-disclosure. This was done by implementing a modified version of the Ferguson et al. (2019) computer mouse-tracking paradigm. Results Consistent with previous findings, participants made more explicit positive social judgments of confidence, friendliness, extroversion, and intelligence after a stuttering self-disclosure, but the distractedness category was resistant to change. Also consistent with previous findings, participants experienced a higher degree of cognitive competition (i.e., higher area under the curve) shortly after self-disclosure, which lessened over time. Conclusions Explicit and implicit biases exist, but self-disclosure significantly impacts the cognitive system of listeners. Specifically, self-disclosure may reduce explicit bias through experience and explicit belief updating, but when cognitive heuristics are strong, implicit bias may be slower to change.