Author:
Chen Gang,Zhu Zhenyan,Mao Baolei,Chen Wenxuan,Jian Jie,Zhang Zijiao,Zhuang Yan
Abstract
Abstract
Hardware timing channels are likely to leak information and easily ignored, which has gradually become the target of attacker. However, there are few investigations systematically analyse hardware timing channel detection and mitigation. In this article, we perform in-depth analysis for the detection technologies such as taint analysis, fuzzing, symbolic analysis and information statistics. And we further analyse some mitigation techniques such as taint analysis and algorithm analysis. Moreover, we compare and analyse the methodologies and characteristics of detecting and mitigating timing channel attack in recent years, and proposes a feasible perspective.
Subject
General Physics and Astronomy
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