The possibility of creating an ICSID protocol for the establishment of a multilateral investment tribunal: A flexible or complex process.

Abstract

Abstract The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was introduced in 2015 with its 16th goal which has targeted enhancing the concepts of the rule of law and universal access to justice. This goal, along with the current trend of directing investment projects towards sustainable development, has brought the mechanisms for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) into the spotlight in the realm of global investment. Recently, based on a different vision that was supported, especially by the European Union, a new approach to ISDS emerged that is characterized by fundamental differences from the well-known approach represented in the ICSID system. Whereas providing facilities to settle and arbitrate the investment disputes between a state member and investors belonging to another state member over several decades by the ICSID system made it a key player in the administration of the ISDS system. The fundamental differences adopted by the new EU’s model represent a serious challenge to the ICSID system. Especially if this new system proves to be effective and widely used and inserted in future international investment agreements (IIAs), the ICSID will be required to make adjustments that are compatible with this new system. Due to the complexity of the process of amendment to the ICSID convention, as it requires unanimous consent by all member states, the present paper, by analysing some historical stations of the functional and administrative context of the ICSID, examines the flexibility of the ICSID convention to establish a protocol that includes the features of the new system without resorting to amending the convention. The paper concludes that the ICSID enjoys the flexibility necessary to establish this protocol. Finally, the paper presents the motives and benefits envisioned for the establishment of this protocol.