Abstract
PurposeThis study aims to examine the effects of ethnic and social identities on negotiation decision making in the context of the Cyprus conflict.Design/methodology/approachThe author conducts a theory‐driven case study of the 1959 Zurich‐London agreements on Cyprus, analyzing the positions of Turkey, Greece, Britain, and the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities during the negotiation process. The analytical method is the applied decision analysis procedure.FindingsThe analysis of the Zurich‐London negotiations over Cyprus suggests that even in the presence of adversarial ethnic ties, decision makers who have a shared (and salient) social identity are more likely to employ collective‐serving decision strategies and seek even‐handed solutions that will not jeopardize their mutual interests. Here, Turkey and Greece – both NATO members – decided to settle on a commonly agreed negotiation outcome despite their ethnicity‐driven, clashing interests over Cyprus. In contrast, decision makers with severe ethnic fragmentation with no shared social identity (as with the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities) are more prone to employ self‐serving decision strategies and seek zero‐sum negotiation outcomes that will exclusively benefit them.Research limitations/implicationsRegarding the applied decision analysis procedure employed in this study, it is necessary to acknowledge the subjective nature of the construction of the decision matrices with respective values/ratings, even though such procedure is based on empirical and situational evidence.Originality/valueThe study introduces a novel theoretical and analytical framework to the literature on negotiation decision making in identity‐based conflicts by combining the social contextualist perspective with the polyheuristic decision model and using applied decision analysis. By anchoring the analysis in the historical context of the Cyprus conflict, the study also contributes to the relatively underdeveloped literature on conflict management in the Middle East.
Subject
Management of Technology and Innovation,Strategy and Management,Communication
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