How does platform certification affect the marketing performance of sellers in food e-commerce? Interaction with reputation mechanisms

Abstract

PurposePlatform certification constitutes an effective mechanism for managing the lemon problem concerning food e-commerce. This work aims to evaluate the market effect of platform certification and analyzes its correction mechanism for lemon problem combined with reputation mechanism.Design/methodology/approachUtilizing the Gold Seller certification of Taobao.com to serve as an illustration, the authors conducted an empirical study based on the sales data of hairy crabs among 2,239 sample sites over six points in time from October to December 2019, systematically examining the market effect of food e-commerce platform certification along with the interaction between food e-commerce platform certification and reputation mechanisms, followed by a heterogeneity test by product price.FindingsThis study finds that sellers with platform certification can significantly increase their sales. The market effect of platform certification is more easily observed in the low-price product market. In addition, platform certification and reputation mechanisms have complementary effects. In a low-price product market, the complementary effect of platform certification and product reputation diminishes, while the complementary effect of platform certification and seller reputation disappears.Originality/valueThis study explores the market effect of food e-commerce platform certification, reveals the market effect of certification mechanism when multiple signaling mechanisms exist simultaneously and conducts an empirical test based on real market data. It provides a better comprehension of how platform certifications work in food e-commerce.