Abstract
This study examines the use of deception in a dyadic negotiation context. Two independent variables—the salience of ethical standards regarding deception and the availability of alternatives to agreement— were predicted to influence negotiators' willingness to deceive. It was hypothesized the presence of ethical standards would reduce deception, even when organizational reward contingencies and other external pressures favored its use. Competing hypotheses regarding the effects of alternatives were also proposed A role‐play exercise describing a negotiation between an automotive manufacturer and a supplier of component parts was used to test the study hypotheses. Eighty MBA students participated in the exercise. Results showed that the salience of ethical standards decreased the use of deception by negotiators and led to more equal agreements. However, contrary to expectations, the availability of an alternative had no effect on deception. Implications for theory and practice are discussed and future research directions are offered.
Subject
Management of Technology and Innovation,Strategy and Management,Communication
Cited by
73 articles.
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