Author:
Brennan Geoffrey,Pettit Philip
Abstract
The case for secrecy in voting depends on the assumption that voters reliably vote for the political outcomes they want to prevail. No such assumption is valid. Accordingly, voting procedures should be designed to provide maximal incentive for voters to vote responsibly. Secret voting fails this test because citizens are protected from public scrutiny. Under open voting, citizens are publicly answerable for their electoral choices and will be encouraged thereby to vote in a discursively defensible manner. The possibility of bribery, intimidation or blackmail moderates this argument but such dangers will be avoidable in many contemporary societies without recourse to secrecy.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science
Reference50 articles.
1. Pateman , Participation and Democratic Theory, chap. 2.
2. An Epistemic Conception of Democracy
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