Abstract
Abstract
Bermúdez claims that agents think about framed outcomes, not outcomes themselves; and that seemingly incoherent preferences can be rational, once defined over framed outcomes. However, the agents in his examples know that alternative frames describe the same outcome, neutrally understood. This undermines the restriction of their preferences to framed outcomes and, in turn, the argument for rational framing effects.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Behavioral Neuroscience,Physiology,Neuropsychology and Physiological Psychology
Reference1 articles.
1. A Critical Notice of: Frame It Again: New Tools for Rational Decision-Making;Fisher;International Journal of Philosophical Studies,2022
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1 articles.
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