Abstract
The constitutional text in a constitutional democracy does not necessarily constrain constitutional change. Quite the contrary, constitutional change in a constitutional democracy often occurs in ways that depart from the rigid procedures governing constitutional amendment enshrined in the text of the constitutional.In this article, I illuminate this peculiar phenomenon in comparative perspective, drawing from the constitutional traditions of Canada, Germany, India, South Africa and the United States. In addition to illuminating distinctions in the amendment practices of liberal democratic constitutional states, I deploy those contrasts as a springboard to substantive insights about fundamental principles of statehood, namely sovereignty and legitimacy.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Reference187 articles.
1. The Purposes of Framework Legislation;Garrett;J. Contemp. Legal Issues,2005
2. Revolutions and Constitutions: Hannah Arendt's Challenge to Carl Schmitt
3. Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory
4. Interpreting Conflicting Provisions of the Nevada State Constitution;Popkin;Nev. L.J,2004
5. The Supreme Court, 2000 Term
Cited by
49 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献