1. Why else would the Halsema Proposal resemble treaty review in so many ways? For example, supporting the review of civil and political rights, as opposed to socio-economic rights, as well as favoring decentralized review by the courts.
2. On this, see Gerhard van der Schyff, Rethinking the Justification for Constitutional Review of Legislation in the Netherlands, in Europa en de toekomst van de nationale wetgever: Liber amicorum PHilip Eijlander 129 (R.A.J. van Gestel & J. van Schooten eds., 2008); Gerhard van der Schyff, Waarom het wetsvoorstel Halsema tekort schiet: Mythes rondom het verdragsargument, Nederlands Juristenblad 2408 (2009); Jit Peters & Geerten Boogaard, De myhes van Van der Schyff over het initiatiefwetsvoorstel-Halsema, Nederlands Juristenblad 2628 (2009); Joseph Fleuren, Waarom het voorstel-Halsema superieur is, Nederlands Juristenblad 2630 (2009); Gerhard van der Schyff, Over een interpretatierichtsnoer en mythes, Nederlands Juristenblad 2632 (2009).
3. E.g. Hoge Raad, 16 May 1986, NJ 1987, 251, where the Supreme Court stressed that courts had to be careful of value judgments as this has to be left to the legislature. It continued by opining that the courts must be “terughoudend” or reluctant to exercise their powers of review.
4. See Evert Alkema, The Effects of the European Convention on Human Rights and Other International Human Rights Instruments on the Netherlands Legal Order, in The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe: Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, 1 (Rick Lawson & Matthijs de Blois eds., vol. III, 1994) who charts this evolution.
5. In his foreword to J.R. Stellinga, De Grondwet systematisch gerangschikt (1950).