Outcome-based contracting and gaming practices in marketised public employment services. Dilemmas from the Italian case

Abstract

Abstract Concerns about the unintended effects of marketised public employment services are increasingly expressed because there is mounting evidence that such services are frequently characterised by various gaming practices on the part of their providers. To prevent these unintended consequences, payment-by-result approaches have been progressively strengthened. The aim of the research reported in this article was to investigate the extent to which such approaches are able to make service providers accountable for client outcomes. The study used two Italian regional cases in order to compare different and alternative contracting arrangements: Lombardy (outcome-based payments), and Emilia-Romagna (fixed payments). Drawing on rich administrative databases, the analysis relied on a quantitative methodology based on propensity score matching and logistic regressions. Even if outcome-based contracting can make service providers financially accountable for the service outcome, the results of the analysis show that it does not sufficiently prevent gaming practices, resulting in inequity among the services provided.