Abstract
It is sometimes suggested that if a moral theory implies that infanticide can sometimes be permissible, that is sufficient to discredit the theory. I argue in this article that the common-sense belief that infanticide is wrong, and perhaps even worse than the killing of an adult, is challenged not so much by theoretical considerations as by common-sense beliefs about abortion, the killing of non-human animals, and so on. Because there are no intrinsic differences between premature infants and viable fetuses, it is difficult to accept that an abortion performed after the point of viability can be permissible while denying that infanticide can be permissible for a comparably important reason. This and other challenges to the consistency of our intuitions exert pressure on us either to accept the occasional permissibility of infanticide or to reject liberal beliefs about abortion.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Sociology and Political Science,Philosophy
Reference14 articles.
1. Jeff McMahan , The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002)
2. Jeff McMahan , ‘Paradoxes of Abortion and Prenatal Injury’, Ethics 116 (2006), pp. 625–55
3. José Luis Bermúdez , ‘The Moral Significance of Birth’, Ethics 106 (1996), pp. 378–403
4. Peter Singer , Rethinking Life and Death (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1995), pp. 83–4 and 214–17
5. Stephen Mulhall , ‘Fearful Thoughts’, London Review of Books 24 (22 August 2002), p. 16
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