Abstract
This paper investigates the organization of southern agricultural enterprise in 1910, with special regard for the interrelations of race, land tenure conditions, and the allocation of resources. After surveying the distribution of farmers and land among the major racial and tenure classes, I seek to answer two main questions. First, what determined the distribution of farm rental contracts between share-rent and fixed-rent forms, and did the tenant's race influence the form of rental contract he obtained? Second, what effect did the race of the farmers and the form of their land tenure have on the determination of farm size? A concluding section raises some further questions and briefly explores the difficult problem of discovering the effects of racism on the southern economy.
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous),Economics and Econometrics,History
Reference31 articles.
1. “Transaction Costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangements,”;Cheung;Journal of Law and Economics,1969
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42 articles.
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