Affiliation:
1. Institute of Advanced Science Facilities , Shenzhen , China
2. Crawford School of Public Policy , Australian National University , Canberra , Australia
Abstract
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to explore how sharecropping contracts are chosen over fixed-rent contracts. There are two concerning issues. First, theoretical explanation has been criticized for not providing a satisfactory answer to the question as to why share contracts are chosen. Second, among the existing empirical studies, there are great controversies about the impact of variance of output. Inspired by the latest insights from (Cheung, S. N. S. 2014. Economic Explanation. Hong Kong: Arcadia Press.), this paper not only provides an explanation for the choice of share contract that is suitable for empirical testing, but also solves the puzzle over variance of output.
Reference40 articles.
1. Ackerberg, D. A., and M. Botticini. 2000. “The Choice of Agrarian Contracts in Early Renaissance Tuscany: Risk Sharing, Moral Hazard, or Capital Market Imperfections?” Explorations in Economic History 37 (3): 0–257, https://doi.org/10.1006/exeh.2000.0739.
2. Allen, D., and D. Lueck. 1992. “Contract Choice in Modern Agriculture: Cash Rent versus Cropshare.” The Journal of Law and Economics 35 (2): 397–426, https://doi.org/10.1086/467260.
3. Allen, D., and D. Lueck. 1995. “Risk Preferences and the Economics of Contracts.” The American Economic Review 85 (2): 447–51.
4. Allen, D., and D. Lueck. 1999. “The Role of Risk in Contract Choice.” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 (3): 704–36, https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/15.3.704.
5. Anderson, J. R., and P. Hazell. 1989. “Variability in Grain Yields: Implications for Agricultural Research and Policy in Developing Countries.” Public Administration and Development 13 (1): 81.