Affiliation:
1. 1Department of Philosophy, Miami University, Ohio. 212 Hall Auditorium. Oxford, OH 45056, USA
Abstract
AbstractIn this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals – including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations.
Subject
Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous),Philosophy,Anthropology,Language and Linguistics,Communication,Social Psychology
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