What does it mean for a duty to be directed in joint action?

Abstract

AbstractIt is often stated that joint actions are linked to so-called directed duties. It is not just that we should “do our part” in a joint action simply because it is the right thing to do or because it is in our best interest. Instead, we “owe” it to the other participants. Despite its prima facie plausibility, this claim is not well understood. Is it true that duties in joint action are directed? Which notion of directedness is relevant to understanding the normativity of joint action? I first argue that we can characterize the notion of directed duties in joint action in terms of a network of inferentially related normative relations and practices. I apply this analysis to show that duties in joint action are directed. This analysis supports the view that the normativity in joint action is special as it involves what Stephen Darwall calls “individual authority” without entailing “representative authority”. A perhaps surprising conclusion derived from this account is that actions in joint action are owed to everyone involved in the group equally. This supports Margaret Gilbert’s joint commitment account of joint intention.