Die Bundeswehr als Zauberlehrling der Politik? Der ISAF-Einsatz und das Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunduz 2003 bis 2012

Abstract

Abstract Using the example of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kunduz, the paper explores the capabilities of military history to contribute to current debates on the change of German Military- and Security policy by providing studies on the »army on operations«. Based on official sources, which the German MoD made generally accessible for researchers of the MGFA/ZMSBw in 2011, the author analyzes the Bundeswehr’s presence in Kunduz between 2003 and 2012. He critically assesses, to what extent the Bundeswehr - aside from supply, logistics and force protection - actually did produce security and stability in Afghanistan. Documents and interviews give an insight into how conceptions of conflict resolution and Peace Building, based on lessons learned on the Balkans, interacted with the experiences made in Northern Afghanistan, but failed to prevent the spread of the Taliban-movement. Field reports, war diaries and other sources reflect the complex interdependency between the troops in the field, higher ISAF commands, and the responsible military staffs in Germany.