Habit and Generalization

Abstract

Abstract Both terms in our title, “habit” and “generalization,” are ordinary language expressions that take a peculiar and abstract sense in Peirce’s thought. From various standpoints, the concepts denoted by these two terms prove to be fundamental for understanding Peirce’s ideas, and eventually for the further development of these ideas in the philosophy of science. My review suggests that Peirce’s thought moves toward a goal that he constantly suggests but never articulates explicitly. This unstated objective is no other than the goal of generalizing the very idea of generalization. This article demonstrates that once the notion of habit is generalized, its connotational range swells to cover such diverse instances as those of symbol, rule, propensity, and law of nature. Therefore, this expanded conception can be applied to unify previously separated strands of thought and scientific practice. These considerations lead me to speculate on the possibility of extending Peircean synechism toward a wider conception that could include the generalizing functions of ideas concerning symmetry (and symmetry breaking) and other kinds of invariance. A version of this paper was first presented at the conference “V Jornadas: Peirce en Argentina” at the Academia Nacional De Ciencias, De Buenos Aires, from August 23 to 24, 2012.