Investment in Green Technology and Entry Deterrence-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Investment in Green Technology and Entry Deterrence

Published:2020-02-01 Issue:2 Volume:20 Page:
ISSN:1935-1682
Container-title:The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy
language:en
Short-container-title:

Author:

Strandholm John C.¹,Espínola-Arredondo Ana²

Affiliation:

1. Johnson College of Business and Economics , University of South Carolina Upstate , 160 East St John St , Spartanburg , SC 29306 , USA

2. School of Economic Sciences , Washington State University , 111C Hulbert Hall , Pullman , WA 99164 , USA

Abstract

Abstract This paper analyzes an entry-deterrence model in which the incumbent decides whether to invest in research and development (R&D) that promotes clean technology. We consider the case in which the entrant could benefit from a technology spillover and analyze the conditions that facilitate the incumbent’s entry-deterrence behavior. We show that higher levels of the spillover make entry more attractive compared to a standard entry game. In addition, regulator and incumbent prefer entry when the spillover from clean technology is sufficiently high and the cost of investing in R&D is relatively low. However, preferences are misaligned when the spillover and cost of R&D are low.

Publisher

Walter de Gruyter GmbH

Subject

Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous),Economics and Econometrics

Link

https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/bejeap-2018-0355/pdf

Reference27 articles.

1. Adelman, D. E., and K. H. Engel. 2008. “Reorienting State Climate Change Policies to Induce Technological Change.” Arizona Law Review 50 (835): 835–78.

2. Damania, D. 1996. “Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 30: 323–36.

3. D’Aspremont, C., and A. Jacquemin. 1988. “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers.” The American Economic Review 78 (5): 1133–37.

4. Datta, A., and E. Somanathan. 2016. “Climate Police and Innovation in the Absence of Commitment.” Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 3 (4): 917–55.

5. Dean, T. J., and R. L. Brown. 1995. “Pollution Regulation as a Barrier to New Firm Entry: Initial Evidence and Implications for Future Research.” The Academy of Management Journal 38 (1): 288–303.

Cited by 6 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Green Investment, Financial Efficiency, and Sustainable Development: Dual Perspectives of Enterprise Cost and Government Guidance;Applied Spatial Analysis and Policy;2024-02-06

2. Green investment, financial efficiency, and sustainable development: Dual perspectives of enterprise cost and government guidance;2023-12-21

3. The bright side of having a strong rival under environmental certification;IISE Transactions;2022-11-12

4. Strategic non‐use of the government's precommitment ability for emissions taxation: Environmental R&D formation in a Cournot duopoly;Australian Economic Papers;2021-12-12

5. A Three-Player Game Model for Promoting the Diffusion of Green Technology in Manufacturing Enterprises from the Perspective of Supply and Demand;Mathematics;2020-09-14