A Three-Player Game Model for Promoting the Diffusion of Green Technology in Manufacturing Enterprises from the Perspective of Supply and Demand

Abstract

Taking the rational use of environmental regulations to promote the diffusion of green technology innovation in China’s manufacturing enterprises as the starting point, this study analyzed the benefits to the government, innovation-supplying enterprises, and potential demand-oriented enterprises. In addition, a tripartite evolutionary model was constructed to examine the impact of command-and-control environmental regulation and market-driven environmental regulation on the diffusion of green technology innovation in manufacturing enterprises. Finally, the study compared and analyzed the heterogeneous effects of different types of environmental regulation tools on the diffusion of green technology innovation in manufacturing enterprises using local stability analysis and numerical simulation. The results are as follows: (i) When the government does not implement environmental regulation tools or the regulation intensity is relatively small, the diffusion depth of green technology innovation in manufacturing enterprises is zero. (ii) When government regulation reaches a certain level, the system of manufacturing enterprises, innovation-supplying enterprises, and potential demand-oriented enterprises will choose to actively promote the diffusion of green technology innovation following a long evolution process. (iii) Increasing the punishment intensity and subsidy rate of green technology innovation can stimulate the diffusion of green technology innovation in manufacturing enterprises. (iv) The comprehensive use of the two kinds of environmental regulation tools has a heterogeneous influence on the strategic choice of green technology innovation diffusion subjects of manufacturing enterprises, and its incentive effect on potential demand-oriented enterprises is relatively poor.