Ungleichheit, Sozialstaat und demokratische Repräsentation: Marktkorrigierende Politik durch den Medianwähler?

Abstract

Abstract Political economy of redistribution and comparative social policy research view the median voter as the political force, which demands marketregulating social policy in periods of increased income disparities and to which governments – to be re-elected – must respond. However, government responsiveness has been questioned, especially the responsiveness for political demands of low-income households. Are even the preferences of the median voter only selectively addressed through politics? If the median voter is actually influential, its redistributive preferences should explain the outcome of government action, e.g. size of redistribution. Is this true? Based on a pooled dataset with observations between 1980 and 2012 for 13 OECD-countries it is shown that the political position of the median voter alone has no impact. Rather mediating political factors like a proportional electoral system and left parties with wider welfare programs provide for broader representation and more redistribution.