1. Partho S. Ghosh. Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia, Manohar, New Delhi, 1989, p. 64.
2. The East Pakistan Student League'. leaded by Sirajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzaq, Sheikh Fazlul Huq Moni and Tufail Ahmed were given the task of recruiting students and youth to the Mukti Bahini. The Awami League did not trust those who had contested against its six-point programme. Attempts to control the Mukti Bahini, including deciding who would be recruited, created misunderstanding between various groups equally committed to fight. See Anisuzzaman,Identity, Religion and Recent History, MAKIAS, Kolkata, 1995, p. 54.
3. Anisuzzaman, no.2, p. 53. General Osmani, Bangladeshi Commander of the Joint Force wanted to be seen in an operational role in planning the war strategy. It was Prime Minister Tajuddin who persuaded him to cooperate with the Indian Command which irritated him at times. Relations between Osmani and Indian Commanders remained prickly at times. J.N. Dixit,Liberation and Beyond: Indo-Bangladesh Relations, Picus Books, Delhi, 2003, pp. 103–4. Abu Taher, Major Ziauddin, and Major Zia-ur-Rahman and some other sectors commanders of Bangladesh supported the idea that all the military command should be moved inside the Bangladesh border while Major Khaled Musharaf, Major Shafiullah and Gen. Osmany wanted it to stay inside the Indian territory.
4. Mujib Bahini was formed because many of Sheikh Mujib's confidants like Fazlul Haq, Sirajul Alam Khan, Abdur Razzal, Tofael Ahmad feared that (he increasing popularity of Mukti Bahini. which had considerable political influence in local areas, may lead it to eventually take over from the older AL leadership in the event of Mujib not returning from his imprisonment in Pakistan. See Talukdar Maniruzzaman,Radical Left and the Emergence of Bangladesh, Mowla Brothers, Dhaka. 2003, p. 100.
5. See Moudud Ahmed,Bangladesh: Era of Sheikh Mujibur Reliman, UPL, Dhaka. 1983. pp. 1–2. According to him, during the days of Tajuddin Ahmed, had the Indian Army not been there he would have been overthrown by the freedom fighters who established their political influence in the absence of a government. Abu Taher who helped Zia to capture power also resented the Indian Army presiding over the surrender ceremony of the Pakistan armed forces. See Lawrence Lifschultz,Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution, Zed Books, London, 1979, p. 37. According to J.N. Dixit Indian military' High Command failed to ensure the presence of General Osmany, commander of Bangladesh side of the joint Command. The formal explanation was his helicopter did not take off. This event generated much resentment among the political class in Bangladesh. See J.N. Dixit, no. 4, p. 109. Lt Gen J.F.R. Jacob in his book just mentions that M.A.G. Osmany ‘was not to be seen’ during the surrender ceremony. See J.F.R Jacob,Surrender at Dacca.Manohar Publishers, 1997, p.146