1. Now I suppose that, for each characterization I have just mentioned, it could be argued that the description could be extended to apply to both arguments1 and arguments2. This might well be true, but I think that in each case it would be clear that the characterization was an extended one, that some shift in the meaning of the characterization had occurred.
2. These related distinctions are not quite as clear-cut as is the distinction between the two senses of argument. There are several reasons for this. One is that an arguer1 (who is arguing1, who is making arguments1) will often at the same time be an arguer2 (be arguing2, be engaged in an argument2). Another is that some might be inclined to say that a person who seems to be engaged in an argument2 but who is not making arguments1 is actually not engaged in an argument2 at all, but rather is engaged in, say, a quarrel (that is, some might want to restrict the sense of “argument2” so that quarrels and the like are excluded); this restricted sense of “argument2” makes it necessarily true that an arguer2 be an arguer1. But surely one can be an arguer2 without being an arguer2, since one can make arguments1 without becoming engaged in an argument2 (if, for example, one's arguments1 are ignored), and thus one can argue1 without arguing2. So while these related distinctions are somewhat murky, they still seem to have some merit.
3. Brockriede, “Where is Argument?” p. 180.