Federalism and the politics of the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans

Abstract

AbstractDrawing on the literature on federalism and public policy, the present article explores the recent politics of two highly-similar and closely integrated Canadian public pension programs created in the mid-1960s: the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) and the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP). This article argues that the parallel evolution of CPP/QPP can be understood by examining how the unique jurisdictional arrangements for the CPP/QPP interacted with other factors to generate by these linked programs have led to the emergence of specific federalism policy dynamics, while muting or foreclosing other potential policy dynamics. As shown, governments have engaged in a process of ‘collusive benchmarking’ that has limited the scope of the available policy options. Differing demographic trends in Quebec and the ‘Rest of Canada’ have strained but also reinforced this policymaking dynamic in recent years. Simultaneously, intergovernmental race to the top dynamics have facilitated the recent push for both CPP and, later, QPP expansion.