Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

Author:

Mylovanov Tymofiy1,Zapechelnyuk Andriy2

Affiliation:

1. University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics (email: )

2. School of Economics, University of Edinburgh (email: )

Abstract

Two debaters address an audience by sequentially choosing their information strategies. We compare the setting where the second mover reveals additional information (constructive argumentation) with the setting where the second mover obfuscates the first mover’s information (toxic argumentation). We reframe both settings as constrained optimization of the first mover. We show that when the preferences are zero-sum or risk-neutral, constructive debates reveal the state, while toxic debates are completely uninformative. Moreover, constructive debates reveal the state under the assumption on preferences that capture autocratic regimes, whereas toxic debates are completely uninformative under the assumption on preferences that capture democratic regimes. (JEL D72, D82, D83)

Publisher

American Economic Association

Subject

General Economics, Econometrics and Finance

Reference69 articles.

1. Political disagreement and information in elections

2. Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders

3. Arieli, Itai, Yakov Babichenko, and Fedor Sandomirskiy. 2022. "Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators." arXiv: 2203.04285.

4. Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling

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