A tripartite evolutionary game analysis of providing subsidies for pick-up/drop-off strategy in carpooling problem

Abstract

AbstractAlthough the pick-up/drop-off (PUDO) strategy in carpooling offers the convenience of short-distance walking for passengers during boarding and disembarking, there is a noticeable hesitancy among commuters to adopt this travel method, despite its numerous benefits. Here, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game theory (EGT) model to verify the evolutionary stability of choosing the PUDO strategy of drivers and passengers and offering subsidies strategy of carpooling platforms in carpooling system. The model presented in this paper serves as a valuable tool for assessing the dissemination and implementation of PUDO strategy and offering subsidies strategy in carpooling applications. Subsequently, an empirical analysis is conducted to examine and compare the sensitivity of the parameters across various scenarios. The findings suggest that: firstly, providing subsidies to passengers and drivers, along with deductions for drivers through carpooling platforms, is an effective way to promote wider adoption of the PUDO strategy. Then, the decision-making process is divided into three stages: initial stage, middle stage, and mature stage. PUDO strategy progresses from initial rejection to widespread acceptance among drivers in the middle stage and, in the mature stage, both passengers and drivers tend to adopt it under carpooling platform subsidies; the factors influencing the costs of waiting and walking times, as well as the subsidies granted to passengers, are essential determinants that require careful consideration by passengers, drivers, and carpooling platforms when choosing the PUDO strategy. Our work provides valuable insight into the PUDO strategy’s applicability and the declared results provide implications for traffic managers and carpooling platforms to offer a suitable incentive.