Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, we investigate how loss aversion affects people’s behavior in private litigation. We find that a loss-averse plaintiff demands a higher settlement for intermediate claims to maintain her threat to proceed to trial following rejection compared to a loss-neutral plaintiff. For larger claims, a loss-averse plaintiff demands a lower offer to increase the settlement probability as loss pains her extra in trial. We also investigate how various policies affect loss-averse litigants’ settlement decisions. Only a reduction in the asymmetry of information about trial odds uniformly leads to higher settlement rates.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Law,Economics and Econometrics,Business and International Management
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