Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance

Published:2008-06-29 Issue:4 Volume:42 Page:491-508
ISSN:0924-6460
Container-title:Environmental and Resource Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Environ Resource Econ

Author:

McEvoy David M.,Stranlund John K.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10640-008-9220-1.pdf

Reference39 articles.

1. Arguedas C (2007) To comply or not to comply? Pollution standard setting under costly monitoring and sanctioning. Forthcoming in Environ Resour Econ

2. Barrett S (1994) Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxf Econ Pap 46(1): 878–894

3. Barrett S (1997a) The strategy of trade sanctions in international environmental agreements. Resour Energy Econ 19(1): 345–361. doi: 10.1016/S0928-7655(97)00016-X

4. Barrett S (1997b) Heterogeneous international environmental agreements. In: Carraro Carlo(eds) International Environmental Negotiations. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA

5. Barrett S (1998a) On the theory and diplomacy of environmental treaty making. Environ Resour Econ 11(1): 317–333. doi: 10.1023/A:1008243528330

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