Climate Coalition Formation When Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Climate Coalition Formation When Players are Heterogeneous and Inequality Averse

Published:2016-04-08 Issue:1 Volume:65 Page:33-59
ISSN:0924-6460
Container-title:Environmental and Resource Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:Environ Resource Econ

Author:

Vogt Carsten

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law,Economics and Econometrics

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s10640-016-0016-4.pdf

Reference30 articles.

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4. Botteon M, Carraro C (1997) Burden sharing and coalition stability in environmental negotiations with asymmetric countries. In: Carraro C (ed) International environmental negotiations, strategic policy issues. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, pp 26–55

5. Bolton GE, Ockenfels A (2000) ERC—a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. Am Econ Rev 90:166–193

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