Affiliation:
1. Smeal College of Business, 310 Beam, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802.
2. Faculty of Economics and Management, University of Magdeburg, P.O. Box 4120, D-39016 Magdeburg, Germany.
Abstract
We demonstrate that a simple model, constructed on the premise that people are motivated by both their pecuniary payoff and their relative payoff standing, organizes a large and seemingly disparate set of laboratory observations as one consistent pattern. The model is incomplete information but nevertheless posed entirely in terms of directly observable variables. The model explains observations from games where equity is thought to be a factor, such as ultimatum and dictator, games where reciprocity is thought to play a role, such as the prisoner's dilemma and gift exchange, and games where competitive behavior is observed, such as Bertrand markets. (JEL C78, C90, D63, D64, H41)
Publisher
American Economic Association
Subject
Economics and Econometrics
Cited by
3631 articles.
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