Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention

Published:2008-03-11 Issue:3 Volume:171 Page:433-442
ISSN:0039-7857
Container-title:Synthese
language:en
Short-container-title:Synthese

Author:

Miller Alexander

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

General Social Sciences,Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s11229-008-9316-8.pdf

Reference10 articles.

1. Davidson D. (1980). Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford, OUP

2. Kripke S. (1982). Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Oxford, Blackwell

3. Miller A. (2007). Another objection to Wright’s treatment of intention. Analysis 67, 257–263

4. Miller A., Wright C. (eds). (2002). Rule following and meaning. Chesham, Acumen

5. Wright, C. (1987). On making up one’s mind: Wittgenstein on intention. In P. Weinengartner & G. Schulz (Eds.), Proceedings of the XIth International Wittgenstein Symposium. Vienna: Holder-Pickler-Tempsky. Reprinted in C. Wright (2001) Rails to infinity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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