Blind Rule-Following, Properly Construed

Abstract

Abstract This chapter develops responses to Paul Boghossian’s Inference Problem and Crispin Wright’s Minor Premise Problem (as outlined in Chapter 3). It does this by arguing that in each case the problem makes an assumption that Wittgenstein justifiably rejects in the second paragraph of Philosophical Investigations §201. The assumption in question is that following a rule necessarily involves interpretation. It connects the idea that there is a way of following a rule which does not involve interpretation to the notion of blind rule-following. Whereas Boghossian and Wright take the idea of following a rule blindly to involve the rejection of the idea that accepting a rule is an intentional state, the chapter argues that it leaves this idea intact but reasserts the lesson of §201. Blind rule-following is rule-following that is not based on an interpretation of the rule. The work seemingly done by “interpretation” is in fact done by the notion of training in a practice or custom.