Abstract
AbstractMorality, according to some theories, demands a lot of us. One way to defend such demanding moral theories is through an appeal to the division of normativity; on this picture, morality is only one of the normative domains that guides us, so it should be expected that we often fail to follow that guidance. This paper defends the division of normativity as a response to demandingness objections against an alternative: moral rationalism. It does this by addressing and refuting three arguments: the argument from blameworthiness, the argument from agency, and the argument from authority. In turn, I show that none of these arguments work as responses to the division of normativity – if normativity generally is divided, so too must be blameworthiness, agency, and authority.
Funder
Arts and Humanities Research Council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Philosophy
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1. Two Ways of Limiting Moral Demands;The Philosophical Quarterly;2023-10-20