Abstract
AbstractThe Liar paradox arguably shows that a coherent and self-applicable notion of truth is governed by nonclassical logic. It then seems natural to conclude that classical logic is inadequate for defining a truth theory. In this article, we argue that this is not the case. In the spirit of Reinhardt (Math Logic Formal Syst 94:227, 1985; J Philos Logic 15:219–251, 1986), and in analogy with Hilbert’s program for the foundation of classical mathematics, we will articulate an instrumentalist justification for the use classical logic: it will be argued that classical reasoning is a useful but dispensable instrument, which can yield philosophically adequate truth theories.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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