Abstract
AbstractMany philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Reference53 articles.
1. Bagley, B. (2017). Properly proleptic blame. Ethics, 127(4), 852–882.
2. Bennett, C. (2002). The Varieties of Retributive Experience. The Philosophical Quarterly, 52(207), 145–163. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00259
3. Berman, M. N. online first. Blameworthiness, Desert, and Luck. Noûs. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12405
4. Carlsson, A. B. (2017). Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt. The Journal of Ethics, 21(1), 89–115.
5. Caruso, G. D. (2018). Skepticism About Moral Responsibility. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Spring 2018. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility/
Cited by
2 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献