Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials

Published:2016-09-20 Issue:8 Volume:174 Page:2029-2044
ISSN:0031-8116
Container-title:Philosophical Studies
language:en
Short-container-title:Philos Stud

Author:

Stoutenburg Gregory^ORCID

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11098-016-0786-0/fulltext.html

Reference25 articles.

1. Bach, K. (2005). The Emperor’s New ‘Knows’. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: knowledge, meaning, and truth (pp. 51–89). New York: Oxford University Press.

2. Bach, K. (2010). Knowledge in and out of context. In J. K. Campbell, M. O. ‘Rourke, & H. S. Silverstein (Eds.), Knowledge and skepticism (pp. 105–136). Cambridge: MIT Press.

3. Black, T. (2005). Classic invariantism, relevance and warranted assertability manœuvres. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55(219), 328–336.

4. Black, T. (2008). A warranted-assertability defense of a Moorean response to skepticism. Acta Analytica, 23(3), 187–205.

5. Brown, J. (2006). Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres. Philosophical Studies, 130(3), 407–435.

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