A Warranted-assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

A Warranted-assertability Defense of a Moorean Response to Skepticism

Published:2008-09 Issue:3 Volume:23 Page:187-205
ISSN:0353-5150
Container-title:Acta Analytica
language:en
Short-container-title:Acta Anal

Author:

Black Tim

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Philosophy

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12136-008-0034-0.pdf

Reference42 articles.

1. Bach, K. (2005). The emperor’s new ‘knows’. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), Contextualism in philosophy: On epistemology, language and truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

2. Blaauw, M. (2003). WAMming away at contextualism. Sats - Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 4, 88–97.

3. Black, T. (2002). A Moorean response to brain-in-a-vat scepticism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, 148–163.

4. Black, T. (2005). Classic invariantism, relevance, and warranted assertability manœuvers. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 328–336.

5. Black, T. (2008). Defending a sensitive neo-Moorean invariantism. In V. F. Hendricks & D. Pritchard (Eds.), New waves in epistemology (pp. 8–27). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

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