Abstract
AbstractThis paper has two aims: (1) it develops and defends a fully-fledged account of the epistemic normativity of conjecture (2) it goes sharply against orthodoxy, in arguing that conjecture is epistemically more demanding than assertion. According to the view defended here, one’s conjecture thatpis permissible only if one knows that one has warrant, but not sufficient warrant to believe thatp. I argue for my account on three independent grounds: (1) the Bach and Harnish account of the nature of communicative speech acts, (2) the plausible normative relation between assertion and other constatives, and (3) the normativity of belief in conjunction with constatives’ epistemic function.
Funder
h2020 european research council
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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