Author:
Wagner Johannes M. J.,Pölzler Thomas,Wright Jennifer C.
Abstract
AbstractPhilosophical arguments often assume that the folk tends towards moral objectivism. Although recent psychological studies have indicated that lay persons’ attitudes to morality are best characterized in terms of non-objectivism-leaning pluralism, it has been maintained that the folk may be committed to moral objectivism implicitly. Since the studies conducted so far almost exclusively assessed subjects’ metaethical attitudes via explicit cognitions, the strength of this rebuttal remains unclear. The current study attempts to test the folk’s implicit metaethical commitments. We present results of a newly developed Implicit Association Test (IAT) for metaethical attitudes which indicate that the folk generally tend towards moral non-objectivism on the implicit level as well. We discuss implications of this finding for the philosophical debate.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Philosophy,Experimental and Cognitive Psychology
Reference61 articles.
1. Ayars, A., and S. Nichols. 2019. Rational learners and metaethics: Universalism, relativism, and evidence from consensus. Mind and Language 35 (1): 67–89.
2. Beebe, J.R. 2014. How different kinds of disagreement impact folk metaethical judgments. In Advances in experimental moral psychology, ed. J.C. Wright and H. Sarkissian, 167–187. Bloomsbury Academic.
3. Beebe, J.R., and D. Sackris. 2016. Moral objectivism across the lifespan. Philosophical Psychology 29 (6): 912–929.
4. Beebe, J.R., R. Qiaoan, T. Wysocki, and M.A. Endara. 2015. Moral objectivism in cross-cultural perspective. Journal of Cognition and Culture 15: 386–401.
5. Blackburn, S. 2006. Antirealist expressivism and quasi-realism. In The Oxford handbook of ethical theory, ed. D. Copp, 146–162. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cited by
4 articles.
订阅此论文施引文献
订阅此论文施引文献,注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献,订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献