Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Adverse selection and Pareto improvements through compulsory insurance

Published:1981 Issue:3 Volume:37 Page:547-558
ISSN:0048-5829
Container-title:Public Choice
language:en
Short-container-title:Public Choice

Author:

Dahlby B. G.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,Sociology and Political Science

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF00133751.pdf

Reference11 articles.

1. Akerlof, G. A. (1970), The market for ?Lemons?: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism.Quarterly Journal of Economics 84(August): 488?500.

2. Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care.American Economic Review 53(December): 941?973.

3. Dahlby, B. G. (1979). Adverse selection and the case for compulsory health insurance. Research paper 79-22. Department of Economics, University of Alberta.

4. Dahlby, B. G. (1980). The welfare effects of prohibiting statistical discrimination in insurance markets. Research paper 80-5. Department of Economics, University of Alberta.

5. Johnson, W. R. (1977). Choice of compulsory insurance schemes under adverse selection.Public Choice 31(Fall): 23?35.

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