Abstract
Abstract
Researchers recognize the affinity of habits-as-heuristics and habits-as-routines. This paper argues that the affinity should not be surprising, as both kinds of habits are the outcome of rational choice. The paper finds that the dual process theory, once reconstructed as based on rational choice, reveals that the affinity runs deep, as three-fold parallelism: i) the cognitive economy responsible for habits-as-heuristics parallels what this paper calls the “physiological economy” responsible for habits-as-routines; ii) the occasional slipup of heuristics generated by the cognitive economy parallels the occasional slipup of routines of the physiological economy; and iii) the breakdown of heuristics of the cognitive economy parallels the breakdown of routines of the physiological economy. The rationality-based dual process theory can explain—whereas the single process theory cannot—why slipups do not induce the decision makers to abandon the pertinent habit, but breakdowns do.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
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