Abstract
AbstractIn this paper we explore the factors that determine delegation of implementation in project aid. In particular, focusing on the importance of informational asymmetry between levels of government, we empirically assess whether this choice is influenced by the relative importance of the local information at the recipient country level. Moreover, we test whether this choice can in turn influence project performance. Using information on more than 5800 World Bank projects for the period 1995-2014, and controlling for characteristics at both country and project level, we find that transparency does influence the probability that a project is implemented locally rather than nationally. More specifically, a one standard deviation decline in transparency increases the probability of a locally implemented project by three percentage points. We also find that a local implementing agency may increase the probability of a successful project only up to a certain level of a country’s transparency.
Publisher
Springer Science and Business Media LLC
Subject
Economics and Econometrics,Political Science and International Relations
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