Mechanism design for land acquisition-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

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Mechanism design for land acquisition

Published:2016-11-05 Issue:3 Volume:46 Page:783-812
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Sarkar Soumendu

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00182-016-0556-4/fulltext.html

Reference32 articles.

1. Bikhchandani S, de Vries S, Schummer J, Vohra RV (2002) Linear programming and vickrey auctions. Math Internet E-auction Markets 127:75–116

2. Cai H (2000) Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information. J Econ Theory 93:260–276

3. Cai H (2003) Inefficient Markov perfect equilibria in multilateral bargaining. Econ Theory 22(3):583–606

4. Chatterjee K, Samuelson W (1983) Bargaining under incomplete information. Oper Res 31:835–851

5. Clarke EH (1971) Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice 11:17–33

Cited by 11 articles. 订阅此论文施引文献订阅此论文施引文献，注册后可以免费订阅5篇论文的施引文献，订阅后可以查看论文全部施引文献

1. Buying from a Group;American Economic Review;2024-08-01

2. Double auction for trading perfect complements;Journal of Public Economic Theory;2023-10-30

3. Cost of efficiency in trading perfect complements;Economics Letters;2023-09

4. Bargaining for assembly;Theory and Decision;2022-11-01

5. Optimal mechanism for land acquisition;Review of Economic Design;2021-07-06

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