Linear Programming and Vickrey Auctions-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Linear Programming and Vickrey Auctions

Published:2002 Issue: Volume: Page:75-115
ISSN:0940-6573
Container-title:Mathematics of the Internet
language:
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Author:

Bikhchandani Sushil,De Vries Sven,Schummer James,Vohra Rakesh V.

Publisher

Springer New York

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-1-4684-9277-4_6

Reference23 articles.

1. Ahuja, R.K., T.L. Magnanti, and J.B. Orlin, Network Flows, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1993.

2. Ausubel, L. (1997): “An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” http://www.ausubel.com/auction-papers/97wp-efficient-ascending-auction.pdf . Working Paper 97–06, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.

3. Bertsimas, D. and C.-P. Teo (1998): “From Valid Inequalities to Heuristics: A Unified View of Primal-dual Approximation Algorithms in Covering Problems,” Operations Research, 46, 503–514.

4. Bikhchandani, S. and J. Ostroy (2000a): “The Package Assignment Model,” mimeo, U.C.L.A.

5. —— (2000b): “Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions,” mimeo, U.C.L.A.

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