1. The term pragmatic instrumentalist is taken from Dewey’s use of the term in The Quest for Certainty in Jo Ann Boydston, ed., The Later Works of John Dewey, 1925–1953, Vol. 4: 1929 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984, footnote, p. 30. It is hoped that by using “pragmatic” to modify “instrumentalist” one can clearly differentiate between Dewey’s use of “instrumental” and Karl Popper’s use of the term in his philosophy of science. See Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Basic Books, 1959), footnote, p. 59. Alas, the failure to make this differentiation between the Deweyan and Popperian uses of the term has led to considerable intellectual mischief, a matter that will be taken up later in a comment on Friedman’s “instrumentalism.” One must also differentiate between Dewey’s use of the term from that of Jurgen Habermas. Habermas confines the term instrumental to the technical cognitive interest which he distinguishes from “practical” and “emancipatory” human interests. In contrast, Dewey’s use of instrumentalism spans the three realms of human interests identified by Habermas. See Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 308–311. For a discussion the Habermasian usage, see Jon D. Wisman, “Toward a Humanist Reconstruction of Economic Science,” Journal of Economic Issues 13 (March 1979): 19–48; and “Economic Knowledge, Evolutionary Epistemology, and Human Interests,” Journal of Economic Issues 23 (June 1989): 647–656.
2. There is no intention here to diminish the importance of Peirce’s philosophical influence on institutionalist methodology. Philip Mirowski, for one, suggests that while Dewey has, indeed, had a greater influence than Peirce on institutionalist methodology, Dewey’ s dominance must be regarded as a basic weakness in the institutionalist literature. He argues that the viability of institutionalism will depend on whether the “hermeneutical” perspective of Peirce can be substituted for the views of Dewey in guiding the methodology of institutional thought in the future. See Philip Mirowski, “The Philosophical Basis of Institutional Economics,” Journal of Economic Issues 21 (September 1987): 1001–1038; and the author’s critical comment on this piece, Paul D. Bush, “Institutionalist Methodology and Hermeneutics: A Comment on Mirowski,” Journal of Economic Issues 23 (December 1989): 1159–1172. For two views of Peirce’s influence on institutionalist methodology that are quite different than Mirowski’s, see Alan W. Dyer, “Veblen on Scientific Creativity: The Influence of Charles S. Peirce,” Journal of Economic Issues 20 (March 1986): 21–41; and H.H. Liebhafsky, “Peirce on the Summum Bonnum and the Unlimited Community,” Journal of Economic Issues 20 (March 1986): 5–20.
3. John R. Commons, Institutional Economics, Vol. I and II (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961 [1934]), p. 150.
4. Both studied at Johns Hopkins as graduate students under Peirce. They both taught at the University of Chicago from the late 1890s until 1904 (Veblen, 1892–1904, and Dewey, 1894–1904) and at the New School for Social Research, where Veblen held his last academic post. See Joseph Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America, 7th ed. (Clifton: Augustus M. Kelly, 1972), p. 449; and H.H. Liebhafsky, “An Institutionalist Evaluation of the Recent Apparently, But Only Apparently Fatal Attack on Institutionalism,” Journal of Economics Issues 22 (September 1988): 837–851. The Liebhafsky article contains a discussion of the relationship of Veblen and Dewey to Peirce and Ayres.
5. Dorfman, Thorstein Veblen and His America, p. 450.