On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

On the possibility of welfare-enhancing hard core cartels

Published:2012-01-03 Issue:3 Volume:107 Page:199-216
ISSN:0931-8658
Container-title:Journal of Economics
language:en
Short-container-title:J. Econ.

Author:

Bos Iwan,Pot Erik

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Economics and Econometrics,General Business, Management and Accounting

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s00712-011-0263-3.pdf

Reference30 articles.

1. Bittlingmayer G (1995) Output and Stock prices when antitrust is suspended: the effects of the NIRA. In: McChesney FS, Shughart II WF (eds) The causes and consequences of antitrust: the public choice perspective. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 287–318

2. Bittlingmayer G (1982) Decreasing average cost and competition: a new look at the Addyston pipe case. J Law Econ 25: 201–229

3. Bork RH (1993) The antitrust paradox: a policy at war with itself. The Free Press, New York

4. Bos I, Pot E (2010) Welfare-enhancing hard core cartels. METEOR Research Memorandum, 10/004, Maastricht University

5. Deltas G, Salvo A, Vasconcelos H (2009) Welfare-enhancing collusion and trade. Working Paper

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