1. Stata {{Bookstore}}: {{Introductory Econometrics}}: {{A Modern Approach}}, {{Seventh Edition}}. C:\Users\bell\Zotero\storage\QPJ8T5W6\introductory-econometrics.html, english, https://www.stata.com/bookstore/introductory-econometrics/, The seventh edition introduces discrete covariates and the modern potential outcome approach to causal inference earlier and more accessibly in the new sections 2.7, 3.7, 4.7, and in the improved section 7.6. The new subsections 13.2(a) and 13.2(b) clearly explain the difference-in-differences approach to causal inference. The result is that an excellent introductory book has been made even better., 2024-02-11, Stata {{Bookstore}}
2. (2007) European {{Competition Law Annual}}: 2006 : {{Enforcement}} of {{Prohibition}} of {{Cartels}}. Hart Publishing, C:\Users\bell\Zotero\storage\HEUJSKZH\2007 - European Competition Law Annual 2006 Enforcemen.pdf, english, 978-1-84113-751-3 978-1-4725-6014-8, 2023-12-13, 10.5040/9781472560148, European {{Competition Law Annual}}
3. {Abrantes-Metz}, Rosa M. and Connor, John M. and Metz, Albert D. (2013) The {{Determinants}} of {{Cartel Duration}}. IO: Theory eJournal https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2263782, Duration, english, In this paper we model cartel duration as a mixed proportional hazard model and condition on cartel characteristics such as the agency first detecting the cartel, industry, if it is a bid rigging or price fixing cartel, the number of countries affected, the affected sales, and measures of the economic cycle and trend. Results are intuitive and fairly consistent across models, and conform well with theory and prior empirical work. We also found that the model results are sensitive to the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.Among other results, we find that cartels first detected by United States or European Union agencies tend to be longer-lived, likely because those detected by other jurisdictions are primarily follow-ups of related larger and older cartels first uncovered in the United States or Europe. Bid rigging cartels tend to be longer-lived than others, while cartels distributed across geographies tend to be shorter-lived. Cartel durations are increasing in the size of a cartel's affected sales and sanctions. Industries such as Petroleum & Coal, Finance & Insurance, and Food, Feed, Tobacco & Transportation have shorter-lived cartels, while industries such as Electronic Products have longer-lived cartels. The state of the economy can impact the duration of a cartel as well. Cartels where the leading firm has a market share of at least 40% have longer durations. However, the wide variation in the unobserved frailty factor suggests that additional, significant covariates remain unaccounted for in our information set., 2023-12-04, 1556-5068
4. {Abrantes-Metz}, Rosa M. and Taylor, Christopher T. and Froeb, Luke M. and Geweke, John. A {{Variance Screen}} for {{Collusion}}. C:\Users\bell\Zotero\storage\VIZTXSY7\papers.html, english, In this paper, we examine price movements over time around the collapse of a bid-rigging conspiracy. While the mean decreased by sixteen percent, the standard deviation increased by over two hundred percent. We hypothesize that conspiracies in other industries would exhibit similar characteristics and search for "pockets" of low price variation as indicators of collusion in the retail gasoline industry in Louisville. We observe no such areas around Louisville in 1996-2002., 2021-03-22, 10.2139/ssrn.683922, Social Science Research Network, Rochester, NY, ID 683922, March, 2005, {{SSRN Scholarly Paper}}
5. Accenture. Accenture {{Cost}} of {{Cybercrime Study}} 2019. C:\Users\bell\Zotero\storage\3CSI4LUA\accenture-2019-cost-of-cybercrime-study-final.pdf, https://www.accenture.com/\_acnmedia/pdf-96/accenture-2019-cost-of-cybercrime-study-final.pdf, 2022-06-29, 2019