Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in n-person games-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Limiting distributions of the number of pure strategy Nash equilibria in n-person games

Published:1990-09 Issue:3 Volume:19 Page:277-286
ISSN:0020-7276
Container-title:International Journal of Game Theory
language:en
Short-container-title:Int J Game Theory

Author:

Powers I. Y.

Publisher

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Subject

Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty,Economics and Econometrics,Social Sciences (miscellaneous),Mathematics (miscellaneous),Statistics and Probability

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/BF01755478.pdf

Reference7 articles.

1. Chen LHY (1975) Poisson Approximation for Dependent Trials. Ann. Prob. 3: 534–545

2. Chung KL (1974) A Course in Probability Theory, Second Edition. New York: Academic Press, p. 92

3. Dresher M (1970) Probability of A Pure Equilibrium Point in n-Person Games. J of Combinatorial Theory 8: 134–145

4. Gelbaum BR, Olmsted JMH (1964) Counterexamples in Analysis. San Francisco: Holden-Day Inc., p. 117

5. Goldberg K, Goldman AJ, and Newman M (1968) The Probability of an Equilibrium Point. J of Research of National Bureau of Standards U.S.A., 72 B: 93–101

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