Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets-Reference-Cited by-同舟云学术

Feasible Nash Implementation of Social Choice Rules When the Designer Does not Know Endowments or Production Sets

Published:1995 Issue: Volume: Page:367-433
ISSN:
Container-title:The Economics of Informational Decentralization: Complexity, Efficiency, and Stability
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Author:

Hurwicz Leonid,Maskin Eric,Postlewaite Andrew

Publisher

Springer US

Link

http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-1-4615-2261-4_14.pdf

Reference19 articles.

1. Groves, T., and Ledyard, J. 1977. “Optimal Allocation of Public Goods A Solution to the ‘Free Rider’ Problem.” Econometrica 45, 783–811.

2. Hong, L. Endowment Game with Destruction. Unpublished note, dated September 27, 1990.

3. Hong, L. 1991. “Balanced Nash-implementation of Social Choice Correspondences in Production Economies.” Doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota.

4. Hong, L. 1994. “Nash Implementation in Production Economies.” Economic Theory, forthcoming.

5. Hong, L., and Page, S. 1994. “Reducing Informational Costs in Endowment Mechanisms.” Mimeo. Economic Design, forthcoming.

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